Will the gentleman yield on that point? Much of

the credibility of the Cox-Dicks report was the very bipartisan nature

of the investigation and unanimous accord with its recommendations.

Was the nature of that inquiry fundamentally different

than the nature of this task force assignment?

Mr. Secretary and Ambassador Sherman, it’s good

to have you here. Let’s begin with the issue of whether or not we

are getting anything under the 1994 Agreed Framework. I think

certainly at the base of that would be the nuclear weapons capacity

ultimately derived from material in the heavy-water reactor versus

light-water reactor. For those of us that are utterly laymen in evaluating

this question, could you help describe the difference in the

proliferation threat from one to the other?

I would alert you that the prior panel basically dismissed the distinctions

as not terribly significant and that the light-water had

significant proliferation dimensions as well.

The next question would be you have outlined basically

the context for the 1994 Agreed Framework and for the recommendations

of the report as being closely measured engagement

with well defined consequences for failure of the engagement, or

simply a beefed-up defense posture in light of containing a growing

threat—a threat that would grow under that circumstance, as you

just spoke to.

What would be the costs to a containment only approach? Have

you assessed that in any way?

In talking about the accord across the allies,

South Korea and Japan in particular, are they all on board with

the approach outlined in your report, and does that reflect a consensus

reached from varying perspectives, across the stakeholders,

that this is the best alternative to deal with the difficult situation?

Is there a country or major political party in the

region which would basically affirm the report within the Republican

Conference that the framework ought to be ended and ramifications

dealt with accordingly?

Just as a closing observation, they will bear the

lion’s share of the risk in light of their proximity to this thing not

working.

I thank the Chairman. I would be interested in

having the panel respond to the alternative which would be the

cessation of food aid and the concerns that you have noted. What

would be the likely manifestations of just stopping food aid from

the United States to North Korea?